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Abstract
We present and compare definitions of the notion of “statistically
hiding” protocols, and we propose a novel statistically hiding commit-
ment scheme. Informally, a protocol statistically hides a secret if a
computationally unlimited adversary who conducts the protocol with
the owner of the secret learns almost nothing about it. One definition
is based on the L1-norm distance between probability distributions,
the other on information theory. We prove that the two definitions are
essentially equivalent. For completeness, we also show that statisti-
cal counterparts of definitions of computational secrecy are essentially
equivalent to our main definitions.
Commitment schemes are an important cryptologic primitive. Their
purpose is to commit one party to a certain value, while hiding this
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value from the other party until some later time. We present a sta-
tistically hiding commitment scheme allowing commitment to many
bits. The commitment and reveal protocols of this scheme are constant
round, and the size of a commitment is independent of the number of
bits committed to. This also holds for the total communication com-
plexity, except of course for the bits needed to send the secret when it
is revealed. The proof of the hiding property exploits the equivalence
of the two definitions.
Index terms — Cryptology, Shannon theory, unconditional secu-
rity, statistically hiding, multi-bit commitment, similarity of ensem-
bles of distributions, zero-knowledge, protocols.
1 Introduction
Suppose party A conducts a protocol with party B while using some secret
or partly secret input x. How does one state precisely that even if B is
unlimited and behaves arbitrarily, B learns almost nothing about x that he
did not know before?
This question is of interest in cryptologic protocols. In particular, we con-
sider commitment schemes. They consist of two protocols. In the first pro-
tocol, A commits to a value x, while keeping x secret from B. In the second
protocol, which can take place much later, A releases x to B. Commitment
schemes play an important role in designing other cryptologic protocols. For
instance, a folklore protocol for common coin flipping is constructed as fol-
lows: First, A flips a secret coin c1 and commits to it. Next, B flips a coin
c2 and publishes it. Finally, A reveals c1, and c1⊕ c2 is taken as the common
coin that both A and B trust to be random. Commitment protocols are
also important in constructing general perfect or statistical zero-knowledge
protocols, see [23] or [6].
Generally, three types of secrecy are distinguished:
• Perfect secrecy means that an adversary gains absolutely no informa-
tion about the secret.
• Statistical secrecy is also unconditional, i.e., unrestricted adversaries
are considered, but the adversary is allowed to learn a little about the
secret.
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• Computational secrecy means that the adversary is assumed to be re-
stricted to efficient computations, and currently, computational secrecy
always relies on unproven assumptions about the hardness of certain
problems.
To make statistical secrecy precise, it is natural to describe B’s a priori
knowledge about x by a probability distribution p from which he knows that
x is chosen. After the protocol, given B’s view of the protocol, x has a
possibly different distribution q. We can say that B learns almost nothing
new if p and q are somehow close to each other. A complicating, but often
overlooked factor is that this should be true for any a priori distribution p.
In the following, we consider two formal notions of the closeness of ensem-
bles of probability distributions. One of these, which we call the bias-based
secrecy property, is based on the L1-norm difference between p and q. When
x consists of just one bit, this describes the additional advantage B obtains
in guessing the value of x. Thus it is the natural extension of the existing
definition of statistically hiding commitment schemes for one bit. Moreover,
it coincides with the definition of statistical zero-knowledge in [17]. The
other definition is based on the difference in Shannon entropy between p and
q. Thus it describes how much information about x the adversary can learn
from the protocol. We call it capacity-based secrecy property, because it cor-
responds to considering the protocol as a channel with x as input and B’s
view as output. The fact that we can prove this definition to be essentially
equivalent to the first one allows for much more elegant proofs of secrecy, for
instance, if one considers commitments to many bits or many commitments
to the same value.
This last point is illustrated by the proof of secrecy for the commitment
scheme we present in this paper. This scheme allows commitment to many
bits. Its commitment and reveal protocols have a very small constant number
of rounds, and the size of a commitment is independent of the number of
bits committed to. This also holds for the total communication complexity,
except of course for the bits needed to send the secret when it is revealed.
Most schemes in the literature are just bit commitment schemes, and
thus, if one commits to many bits, each bit is expanded to, e.g., 500 bits.
Note that efficient multi-bit commitment schemes can also be used to reduce
the communication complexity of zero-knowledge protocols [20]. A concrete
example of this for Boolean circuit satisfiability is given later in the paper
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(see Section 5.3).
Unconditionally hiding bit commitment schemes were presented, e.g., in
[6, 4, 8]. In these schemes, the fact that A cannot later change the bit
committed to relies on specific number-theoretic assumptions. More general
assumptions are used in [24], which can be based on any collision-intractable
hash function, and [23], based on any one-way permutation. Unconditionally
hiding multi-bit commitment schemes were presented in [3, 26, 9, 2]. They
all rely on specific number-theoretic assumptions, the hardness of computing
discrete logarithms or factoring integers. In contrast, our scheme is based on
any collision-intractable hash function. This is an improvement in theory,
because the assumption is weaker, and useful in practice, because one can
use efficient conventional hash functions such as SHA-1 [27] or RIPEMD-
160 [14] (follow the references in [14] for more such functions and known
attacks). The construction is an improvement of the scheme from [24]. Our
construction was presented in preliminary form at Crypto ’93. A couple of
years later Halevi and Micali, who were apparently unaware of the Crypto
’93 result, rediscovered the construction and presented it at Crypto ’96.
Naor [22] has also presented a multi-bit commitment scheme with small
amortised communication complexity, based on general assumptions. How-
ever, that scheme is of a type dual to ours, i.e., it is only computation-
ally hiding, whereas the binding is unconditional. On stronger assumptions,
schemes of this type must have been known in the folklore before, e.g., based
on efficient probabilistic public-key encryption.
1.1 Organization of the Rest of this Paper
In Section 2, we introduce notation about protocols. In Section 3, we in-
troduce our two main definitions of statistical secrecy. Section 4 shows that
these definitions are equivalent except for small transformations of the se-
curity parameters. In Section 5, we give a precise definition of multi-bit
commitments, present our construction, and prove its security. We show
how this and the results of [20, 5] directly give a statistical zero-knowledge
argument for Boolean circuit satisfiability with small communication com-
plexity. In Section 6, we present further evidence that our definitions of
statistical secrecy are universal: First we show that strengthening the adver-
saries by auxiliary inputs makes no difference, and sequential composition
of statistically secret protocols is therefore possible. Secondly, we consider
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statistical counterparts of well-known computational secrecy definitions and
show that they are also essentially equivalent to our two main definitions.
2 Protocol Notation
The model of protocols used in this paper is based on probabilistic interactive
Turing machines as defined in [17]. These are Turing machines equipped with
a read-only input tape, a work tape, a random tape, and two communication
tapes. One communication tape is write-only and used for sending messages,
and the other is read-only and used for receiving messages.
A 2-party protocol is a pair of interactive Turing machines sharing their
communication tapes. The view of a participant, A, in an execution of an
interactive protocol with B is defined to consist of A’s input, all random bits
used by A, and all the messages sent and received in this execution of the
protocol. We refer to [17] for detailed definitions.
All our protocols have a security parameter k. This means that k in
unary representation is a common parameter on the input tapes of both
participants. Usually, there are secret inputs, too, i.e., parameters that are
on only one of the input tapes. The honest participants in our protocols are
polynomial-time, i.e., the corresponding interactive Turing machines stop
after polynomial time in k.
X̃ will denote any machine playing the role of a machine X in a given pro-
tocol, but not necessarily following the prescribed methods. Such machines
are used to model cheaters. Note that this does not tacitly restrict “unre-
stricted” adversaries B̃ to computable functions, because we will quantify
over k and B̃ separately.
3 Definitions of Secrecy
We now present definitions of the statistical secrecy of one party’s input in
a 2-party protocol.
Consider a 2-party protocol, (A, B), with security parameter k. The
input of A, apart from the common parameter k, is denoted by x. The
question is how much a possibly cheating B̃ learns about x. We assume that
x is chosen from a finite set M(k), whose size N(k) = |M(k)| may depend
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on k. We simply write M and N if no confusion about k is possible. We
also assume that N(k) is non-decreasing and that B does not have an input,
except for k. This assumption does not reduce the generality of the results
of this section, see Section 6.1.
We mostly work in the following probability spaces: Let any B̃, any k,
and any a priori distribution p of A’s input be given, where px denotes the a
priori probability of a particular value x. The protocol now induces a joint
probability space on the views of both parties, determined by the choice of
x and the random choices, i.e., the contents of the random tapes, of both
parties. Probabilities in this space are simply denoted by Pr[·]. Let X
denote the random variable corresponding to x and V the random variable
corresponding to the view of B̃. Whenever one of the parameters B̃, k, and
p is not clear from the context, X or V will be given corresponding indices,
e.g., Xp. Individual views of B̃ are usually denoted by v. Random variables
that are clear from the context are omitted, e.g., we write Pr[x|v].
We denote the a posteriori probability of the input x as seen by B̃ after
an execution of the protocol with resulting view v by q, where
qx = Pr[x | v].





for each view v. In other words, biasp(v) is the distance in the L1-norm,
||p − q||1, between the a priori distribution of the secret input and its a





be the expected value of biasp(v).
Definition 3.1 The protocol has the bias-based secrecy property if Biasp ≤
2−k for all distributions, p, all security parameters, k, and for all adversaries,
B̃. ut
In this definition, B̃ can be specific for a specific p; in other words, B̃
can have arbitrary a priori information about A’s input. It is basically a
definition about the machine A only.
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For the second definition, note that the protocol defines transition prob-
abilities from the secret inputs x to the views v of B̃. If it is considered as a
channel with a value of X as input and a value of V as output, its channel
capacity CB̃ is
CB̃ = maxp (I(Xp;Vp)),
where I denotes the mutual information between two random variables. Re-











Pr[x, v] log2 Pr[x|v]
the conditional entropy of Xp given Vp. For these definitions and simple rules
for computing with mutual information and entropies, see, e.g., [15, Sections
2.2 and 2.3].
Definition 3.2 The protocol is said to have the capacity-based secrecy prop-
erty if, for every adversary, B̃, and every security parameter, k, its channel
capacity CB̃ is at most 2
−k. ut
This is a natural information-theoretic definition of secrecy, because it means
that for any a priori information, B̃’s view from the commit protocol only
gives negligible additional information about X.
4 Relations Between the Definitions
We will show next that the bias-based secrecy property and the capacity-
based secrecy property are equivalent except for small transformations of the
security parameters.
Theorem 4.1 Consider a two-party protocol, (A,B), as above and let n(k) =
log2N(k).
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a) If (A,B) has the bias-based secrecy property, it has a channel capacity
of at most 2−k(n(k) + k) for any B̃.
Thus, a capacity of at most 2−k can be achieved by using a security
parameter k′ where k′ ≥ k + log2(n(k′) + k′).
b) If (A,B) has the capacity-based secrecy property, it has an average bias
of at most
√
2 ln 2 · 2−k/2 for any B̃.
Thus, a bias of at most 2−k can be achieved by using a security param-
eter k′ ≥ 2k + 1.
The two parts of this theorem are proved in the following two subsections.
We also show that the bounds given in both parts are essentially opti-
mal, see the examples at the end of both subsections. In particular, Ex-
ample 4.1shows that there is no bound on the capacity given just the bias,
independent of n(k). This may be the reason why no related inequalities
seem to exist in the literature, in contrast to Part b). Nevertheless, the con-
dition on k′ in Part a) of the theorem is always solvable, unless n(k′), the
number of bits of the secret, is growing exponentially in k′, which would be
unreasonable in practice.
4.1 From Bias to Capacity
We start with some preliminaries about the entropy function.
Definition 4.2 Define 0 log2 0 = 0 according to usual conventions. For any
finite set M , we define a continuation of the entropy function H on all func-
tions p : M → IR+ ∪ {0} (i.e., not only those that are probability distribu-





where px is short for p(x). ut
Note that we have now defined entropy directly on probability distributions,
not only via random variables that induce these distributions. In the fol-
lowing we shall freely use H to denote the entropy in both cases. Thus
H(p) = H(Xp) in the scenario of Section 3.
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Lemma 4.3 Let us define a function H1(x) = −x log2(x) on IR+ ∪ {0}.
Then:
• H1 only has zeros at x = 0 and x = 1.
• H1 is convex-∩ and has a maximum at e−1.
• H1(x) ≥ H1(1− x) for 0 ≤ x < 1/2.
Proof The first part is obvious. For the second part, note that the derivative
isH ′1(x) = −log2(x)−c with c = log2(e). Thus H ′1(x) is monotonic decreasing
with a zero at x = e−1.
The third part is clear for e−1 ≤ x < 1/2, because H1(x) is monotonic
decreasing in this interval. Thus we now consider x < e−1. As H1(x) is
convex-∩, it lies above the line through (0, 0) and (e−1, H1(e−1)) everywhere
in this interval. The gradient of this line is−e−1 log2(e−1)/e−1 = c. Similarly,
H1(1−x) lies below the tangent to H1 at (1, 0) for all x > 0. The gradient of
this tangent is H ′1(1) = −c. Thus H1(x) > cx > H1(1− x) for 0 < x < e−1.
Finally, the case x = 0 is obvious.
ut
Lemma 4.4 Let f be a differentiable convex-∩ function on an interval [a, b] ⊂
IR, and let a distance ε > 0 be given. Then the difference |f(x)− f(x′)| for
values x, x′ ∈ [a, b] with x− x′ = ε is maximal at one of the two boundaries,
i.e., the maximum is either |f(a+ ε)− f(a)| or |f(b)− f(b− ε)|.
Proof We consider the function g(x) = f(x + ε) − f(x) on [a, b − ε]. Its
derivative, g′(x) = f ′(x + ε) − f ′(x), is negative, because f ′ is monotonic
decreasing. Thus g is monotonic decreasing, and |g| is maximal at one of the
boundaries. ut
Lemma 4.5 For any probability distributions p, q on a finite set M ,
|H(p)−H(q)| ≤ H(|p− q|),






(px log2(px)− qx log2(qx))|.
We show the desired inequality pointwise, i.e., with εx = |px − qx|, we show
|px log2(px)− qx log2(qx)| ≤ −εx log2(εx) (∗)
for all x. For symmetry reasons, it suffices to consider px > qx. Note that
we are considering differences between two values H1(px) and H1(qx). As
H1 is convex-∩ by Lemma 4.3, the differences are maximal at either of the
boundaries by Lemma 4.4. These two possibilities are
• |H1(ε)−H1(0)| = H1(ε) and
• |H1(1)−H1(1− ε)| = H1(1− ε).
By Lemma 4.3, the first one is larger. This proves (∗) and thus the lemma.
ut
In the final lemma, we bound “entropies” H(ε) of functions that have small
L1-norm:
Lemma 4.6 If ||ε||1 = d for a function ε : M → IR+ ∪ {0}, then
H(ε) ≤ d(n − log2(d)),
where n = log2 |M |.
Proof We scale ε to L1-norm 1, i.e., to a probability distribution, and exploit
that the entropy of probability distributions on a given set is maximal for














= d(H(E) − log2(d))
≤ d(n − log2(d)).
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This proves the lemma. ut
Proof of Theorem 4.1 a) We fix B̃ and p and prove I(Xp;Vp) ≤ 2−k(n(k)+
k) from the precondition Biasp ≤ 2−k.
In this proof, we denote the distribution of Xp, given that V = v, by q(v),












Pr[v]H(|p− q(v)|) by Lemma 4.5.
We now apply Lemma 4.6. Note that d = ||p− q(v)||1 is just biasp(v). Let f





The function f is easily seen to be convex-∩ for d ≥ 0. Thus we can apply
Jensen’s inequality. Note that the average over v in the formula above equals






≤ 2−k(n(k) + k).
This is the desired result. ut
The following example shows that it is not in general possible to remove the
dependency on n(k) from the bound we have proved.
Example 4.1
Consider the protocol in which the secret input is simply revealed. Then, it
is easy to see that both the average bias and the information are maximal
when the input is uniformly distributed. In this case, the average bias is
2 − 2/N(k) and the information is log2N(k) = n(k). Thus the capacity is
approximately n(k)/2 times the maximal bias. The above bound is therefore
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optimal except for a factor of 2 and the addition of k. Furthermore, this
protocol also shows that the inequality
I(Xp;Vp) ≤ Biasp · (n(k) + k),
which is obtained in the above proof, is optimal within a factor of 2. ut
4.2 From Capacity to Bias
We will prove the second half of Theorem 4.1 using Pinsker’s inequality. Let
µ, η be probability distributions on a finite set with probabilities µi, ηi. Then








where µi log2(µi/ηi) is defined to be 0 if µi = 0 and ∞ if µi > ηi = 0.
Theorem 4.7 Pinsker’s Inequality: The information divergence is related




For background on these results, see [11, p.20 and p.58-59]. For our protocol
situation, we can derive the following lemma:





Proof Let µ be the joint distribution of Xp and Vp, and let η be the distri-
bution we would have if Xp and Vp were independent, i.e., ηx,v = Pr[Xp =
x]Pr[Vp = v]. On the one hand, it can easily be seen that D(µ||η) = I(Xp;Vp)











|Pr[Xp = x|Vp = v]− Pr[Xp = x]|
= Biasp.
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Thus, the lemma follows from Pinsker’s inequality. ut
Theorem 4.1 b) is an immediate consequence of this lemma.
The following example shows that it is really necessary to double the
security parameter when going from capacity to bias.
Example 4.2
We consider a protocol that implements a binary symmetric channel with an
error probability of 12 − ε, independent of B and thus of B̃. Hence we have
two inputs x0, x1 and two views v0, v1 such that Pr[vi|xi] = 1/2 + ε. The
















= 1 + (
1
2
− ε)(log2(1− 2ε)− 1) + (
1
2




− ε) log2(1− 2ε) + (
1
2







+ ε) ln(1 + 2ε) + (
1
2














We now compute Biasp for the case where p is the uniform distribution on










|px − qx| = 2 ·
1
2





which means that the bound in Theorem 4.1 b) is tight except possibly for
a factor of 2. ut
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5 Commitment to Many Bits
5.1 Definitions of Multi-Bit Commitments
We define a multi-bit commitment scheme as a triple (commit, reveal, n),
where commit and reveal are two-party protocols and n : IN→ IN is a function
denoting the length of the strings that can be committed to. The protocols
take place between parties A and B, where A is the party committing herself.
• The commit protocol, (Ac, Bc), has a security parameter k, and Ac
gets a secret value x from {0, 1}n(k) as input. The concatenation of
all messages sent in an execution of the commit protocol is called the
commitment.
Either party may reject in the commit protocol, but if both parties are
honest, this should almost never happen. More formally, Ac and Bc
may output a special value reject, but if in fact (Ac, Bc) is executed,
and not Ãc or B̃c, the probability that an output is reject decreases
faster than k−c for all c > 0.
• The reveal protocol is denoted (Ar, Br). The input of Ar should be
the view of Ac in the commit protocol, while Br gets the commitment
as input. At the end of the reveal protocol, Br outputs reject or a
pair (accept, x). The intuitive meaning is that either B has detected
cheating by A, or he accepts that A has opened the commitment to
reveal the value x.
In some concrete schemes, it makes sense to define the commitment and
the input to Ar as a subset or a function of the messages sent and the view,
respectively. However, our definition is simpler and without loss of generality.
We will only consider commitment schemes with non-interactive opening,
i.e., where the reveal protocol consists of Ar sending one message to Br.
Without loss of generality, we can then assume that the message is of the
form (x,m), where x should be the value committed to, and that Br, on
receiving such a message from Ar or Ãr, never outputs (accept, x’) with
x′ 6= x.
We have already built into the model another useful property that our
construction fulfils and that we call public verification: B can verify the
opening based on the commitment only. This means that anyone who trusts
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that a given commitment is the result of a conversation with B can verify
the opening without knowing B’s random bits.
Note that the equivalence results in the preceding section also hold for
commitment schemes without these two properties.
Definition 5.1 A pair of protocols as described above is called a multi-bit
commitment scheme with non-interactive opening if it has the following two
properties:
• Binding property: Let Ãc be any polynomial-time bounded machine
that executes the commit protocol with B and then outputs two mes-
sages (x,m) and (x′,m′). Intuitively, with these messages, the cheating
committer hopes to have the choice between opening the commitment
to reveal x or x′, respectively. Let p(Ãc, k) be the success probability of
Ãc, i.e., the probability that both messages (x,m) and (x′,m′) would
be accepted by Br. The probability is taken over the coin-flips of Ãc,
Bc and the two executions of Br. Then p(Ãc, k) < k−c for all c > 0 and
k sufficiently large.
• Statistically hiding: A multi-bit commitment scheme is called statisti-
cally hiding if its protocol commit has
– the bias-based secrecy property, see Definition 3.1, or
– the capacity-based secrecy property, see Definition 3.2.
ut
By Theorem 4.1, the two possibilities in the secrecy definition are equivalent
except for small transformations of the security parameter. Recall that these
definitions assume that B̃ can have arbitrary a priori information about the
string committed to.
5.2 Efficient Statistically Hiding Commitments
Naor and Yung have shown that a statistically hiding bit commitment scheme
can be built from collision-intractable hash functions [24]. This scheme needs
interaction only in an initialisation phase, after which both committing and
opening are non-interactive. We now modify this scheme to get efficient
multi-bit commitments. The amortised number of bits of communication
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per bit committed to is only O(1). Our scheme makes use of families of
universal2 hash functions, defined in [7]:
Definition 5.2 A class F of functions A → B, where A and B are finite
sets, is called universal2 if for any distinct a1, a2 ∈ A the probability that
f(a1) = f(a2) is at most 1/|B|, when f is chosen uniformly at random in
F . ut
In practice we need a family F = {Fm}m∈IN of universal2 classes of functions
{0, 1}m → Bm such that the random choice of a function f ∈ Fm, given m,
and the evaluation of f can be done in polynomial time in m.
In particular, our construction will be efficient if we use the following
functions, essentially from [7].
Lemma 5.3 Let m-bit strings be identified with elements of GF (2m). Each
of the following classes Fm of functions from m-bit strings to i-bit strings
(with i ≤ m) is universal2:
Fm = {f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}i; z 7→ az + b|i | a, b ∈ GF (2m)}.
Here |i means taking the i least significant bits.
Moreover, we need collision-intractable hash functions, defined in [12].
Definition 5.4 A family of collision-intractable hash functions is a family
H of finite sets {Hm}m∈IN with the following properties: Each h ∈ Hm is
a function {0, 1}m → {0, 1}l(m), where l(m) : IN → IN is a function with
l(m) < m for all m. Both the random choice of a function h ∈ Hm, given m,
and the evaluation of h are possible in polynomial time in m.
Finally, collision-intractability means that for all c > 0 and all proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithms AH , the probability that AH finds x, y ∈
{0, 1}m such that x 6= y and h(x) = h(y) is less than m−c for m sufficiently
large. The probability is over the random selection of h and the random
choices of AH. ut
In the commitment scheme, we need a family H∗ such that the output length
of functions in H∗k for a security parameter k is k + 1 and the input length
is arbitrary, as long as polynomial in k. By [13], such a collision-intractable
family of functions can be constructed from the functions with the input and
output lengths as in Definition 5.4.




Let k′ = k+1. Bc chooses a random hash function h ∈ H∗k , i.e., h : {0, 1}+ →
{0, 1}k′ , and sends it to Ac.
Commit Protocol
On input an n-bit string x, Ac chooses at random a 3k′-bit string y and a
universal2 hash function f from 3k′ bits to k′ bits. It sends
c = h(f ||h(y)||h(x)⊕ f(y))
to Bc, where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR and || denotes the concatenation
of bit strings. Intuitively, h(x) ⊕ f(y) is h(x) encrypted with a so-called
“privacy amplified” version of y.
Reveal Protocol
Ar sends (f, x, y) to Br. Br checks that c = h(f ||h(y)||h(x)⊕ f(y)). If yes,
it outputs (accept, x), otherwise reject. ut
For the analysis of this protocol, we use the following privacy amplification
result (see Fig. 1).
Theorem 5.5 Let y ∈ {0, 1}k′′ be chosen uniformly at random, and let e :
{0, 1}k′′ → {0, 1}t be an arbitrary function. Let 0 < s < k′′− t, k′ = k′′− t−s
and let F be a universal2 class of hash functions from {0, 1}k
′′ to {0, 1}k′ . If
f is chosen uniformly at random in F , the expected entropy of f(y) when f ,
e and e(y) are given is at least k′ − 2−s/ ln 2 bits. More formally,




Here F denotes the random variable defined by the choice of f (no confusion
with the set F should be possible), and e is fixed and thus not listed in the
condition.
This theorem is almost a restatement of [1, Corollary 5] which in our notation
is I(F (Y );F, e(Y )) ≤ 2−s/ ln 2. One can easily see in the proof of that














Figure 1: Privacy amplification: y is completely random, but some informa-
tion is given by e(y). s is a security margin.
Theorem 5.6 Protocol 1 is a statistically hiding commitment scheme, under
the assumption that the family H is collision-intractable. It allows commit-
ting to n bits by a commitment of size k + 1 bits and total communication
complexity for commitment and opening of 10(k + 1) bits, plus the n bits of
x.
One or more parties A can execute the protocol commit an arbitrary, more
precisely polynomial in k, number of times with B based on one execution of
the initialisation phase.
Proof The size of the commitments and total communication complexity
is clear from the description above and the fact that the universal2 hash
function can be specified by 6k′ bits. We did not count the initialisation
phase here, because we assume that it has been carried out once for many
commitments. Anyway, with most proposed collision-intractable families of
hash functions, a function h can also be specified with d · k bits, where d is
a small integer constant.
The binding property is an immediate consequence of the collision in-
tractability of H: Assume that an algorithm Ãc contradicts the binding prop-
erty. Then construct a collision-searching algorithm AH as follows: On input
h, it simply calls Ãc, which is also a non-interactive algorithm that works on
an input h from the initialisation phase. Suppose Ãc outputs c and (f, x, y) 6=
(f ′, x′, y′) which both open the commitment correctly, and where x 6= x′ (this
is necessary for Ãc’s success). It follows that h(f ′||h(y′)||h(x′)⊕f ′(y′)) = c =
h(f ||h(y)||h(x)⊕f(y)), so if (f ′||h(y′)||h(x′)⊕f ′(y′)) 6= (f ||h(y)||h(x)⊕f(y)),
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AH outputs these two values. Otherwise it follows that h(y) = h(y′). Thus,
AH outputs (y, y′) if y 6= y′. Otherwise, we know y = y′ and f = f ′, and thus
h(x) = h(x′). Therefore AH now outputs (x, x′), where x 6= x′ by the initial
assumption. It follows from this description that the success probability of
AH is exactly the same as that of Ãc.
We now show capacity-based secrecy. First observe that it is enough to
show this for a modified commit protocol in which f, h(y) and h(x) ⊕ f(y)
are sent, since this gives the recipient even more information than before.
Then let an a priori distribution of x and an arbitrary B̃c be given. Applying
Theorem 5.5 with e = h, k′′ = 3k′, and t = s = k′, and thus in fact
k′ = k′′ − t− s, gives a bound on B̃c’s expected uncertainty about f(y) if it
knows f , h, and h(y):
H(F (Y )|F, h(Y )) ≥ k′ − 2
−k′
ln 2
> k′ − 2−k.
The view v of B̃c in the modified commit protocol consists of just these values
v′ = (f, h, h(y)) and h(x) ⊕ f(y). Thus we see that B̃c also has very little
information about X: Let Z = F (Y ); then
I(V ;X) = I(V ′, h(X)⊕ Z;X)
= I(V ′;X) + I(h(X)⊕ Z;X|V ′)
= 0 +H(h(X) ⊕ Z|V ′)−H(h(X) ⊕ Z|X, V ′) (indep. of V ′ and X)
≤ k′ −H(h(X) ⊕ Z,X, Z|X, V ′) (1)
= k′ −H(Z|X, V ′) (2)
= k′ −H(Z|V ′) (indep. of X and V ′, Z)
≤ k′ − (k′ − 2−k) = 2−k .
In (1) we used that X and Z are functions of h(X)⊕ Z and X; similarly in
(2).
As this bound holds for all a priori distributions, it is also a bound on
the capacity.
Note that both parts of this proof are still valid if A makes more than
one commitment based on the same public function h. ut
One can easily see that among the three applications of h in the commit
protocol, only that to y is essential for security. Hashing x may be omitted
19
if x is rather short anyway. The final hashing of the commitment may be
omitted in applications where the efficiency of the reveal protocol seems more
important than that of the commit protocol. The given version with very
short commitments and longer revealing is particularly suitable if not all
commitments are opened.
5.3 Using the Commitment Scheme to Build Zero-
Knowledge Protocols
This subsection considers an application of our commitment scheme to con-
struct zero-knowledge protocols. We assume here that the reader is familiar
with the concepts of proof systems and zero-knowledge. For formal defini-
tions please refer to [17]. An interactive argument is the same as a proof
system, except that the soundness property is only required to hold for all
polynomial time cheatingprovers.
Our commitment scheme allows us to build a statistical zero-knowledge
argument for Boolean circuit satisfiability, and so for any NP problem. This
can be seen by combining the scheme with two other ingredients:
• The protocol by Brassard et al. from [5] for showing that a Boolean
circuit is satisfiable. This protocol works based on any bit commitment
scheme for single bits and is a computational zero-knowledge proof
system or a perfect/statistical zero-knowledge argument, depending on
whether the commitments used are computationally or unconditionally
hiding. The basic step in the protocol is that the prover commits
to O(n) bits, where n is the size of the circuit, and depending on a
random challenge from the verifier, the prover either opens all the bits
or a specific subset of them that depends on the satisfying assignment.
This basic step is iterated a number of times.
• The method by Kilian et al. from [20] for using a multi-bit commit-
ment scheme in any protocol of a type they call “subset-revealing”, of
which the protocol from [5] is an example. The interesting point is
that the method works even though the commitment scheme does not
allow opening individual bits in a multi-bit commitment. The method
replaces each basic step in the original protocol by a new one which
needs 5 messages instead of 3 and contains 2 commitments to O(n) bits
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each instead of O(n) commitments to 1 bit each. If the prover could
cheat in the old basic step with probability 1/2, he can cheat in the
new one with probability 3/4.
By combining these three ingredients, one obtains an extremely efficient
statistical zero-knowledge argument for Boolean circuit satisfiability, and
hence for any NP problem. More precisely, one can prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.7 Assume that a family of collision-intractable hash functions
exists. Then there is a statistical zero-knowledge argument for Boolean cir-
cuit satisfiability with the following properties: if the input circuit is of size
n, then the protocol requires communicating O(n2) bits. If any probabilistic
polynomial-time prover can cheat with probability ε(n) ≥ 2−n, then there is a
probabilistic algorithm that can find collisions for the hash function used in
expected time polynomial in n and proportional to 1/ε(n)2.
Note that for a protocol of the type we consider, there are actually a
number of parameters, which one may consider independently: the size of the
input circuit, n, the logarithm of the probability with which we will allow
the prover to cheat (assuming he cannot break the hash function), and the
output length of the hash function. To simplify, we have followed a number
of earlier works in the theorem above and have let all parameters be O(n).
Using the protocol from [5] based on a 1-bit commitment scheme would
give a communication complexity of O(n3) bits. Kilian [18, 19] has found
a protocol based on probabilistically checkable proofs that would, with our
choice of parameters, have a communication complexity of O(n2 log n) 1. Us-
ing a completely different method, Cramer and Damg̊ard [10] obtained an
argument that also has O(n2) complexity. In comparison, their protocol is
perfect zero-knowledge and constant round, but it is based on more special-
ized assumptions, namely the hardness of computing discrete logarithms in
a group of prime order or of factoring integers.
Perhaps even more interesting is the performance in practice. For in-
stance, if we use SHA-1 as the hash function, which has a 160-bit output,
and we set the maximal probability for the prover to cheat at 2−50, then a
1But our protocol would not be superior to Kilian’s for all choices of parameters – in
fact Kilian shows that the communication complexity does not have to depend on n at all.
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circuit consisting of 10000 gates could be proved satisfiable using about 3
Mbyte of communication.
To assess the computation effort required, it seems reasonable to assume
that an implementation would spend almost all its time hashing. SHA-1 can
be implemented on standard PC’s at speeds around 6-8 Mbyte/sec. This
suggests that, at a security level of 2−50, a real implementation should be able
to handle around 20000 gates per second, assuming that the communication
lines can keep up. To the best of our knowledge this is the most practical
protocol proposed for circuit satisfiability.
6 More Variants of Statistical Secrecy
6.1 Auxiliary Input and Composition
In Section 3, we have defined secrecy of an input x against an adversary B̃
that has no input, or at least none related to x. Such inputs would be called
auxiliary inputs. In computational zero-knowledge, including auxiliary inputs
in the definition proved necessary for the secrecy if a protocol is executed
repeatedly [25, 28]. Similarly, such auxiliary inputs occur if a statistically
hiding protocol is repeated. However, in this case we can show quite easily
that secrecy in the setting with auxiliary input is a consequence of normal
secrecy. We now describe this formally.
An auxiliary-input attacker B̃aux on a two-party protocol (A,B) is defined
just like a normal attacking B̃, except that B̃aux also gets an input y, where
x and y may have an arbitrary joint a priori distribution paux. The intuitive
idea is that y may be an output from a previous protocol that A executed
with the secret x. We define auxiliary-input capacity of such a protocol as
follows: Let Vaux denote the view of B̃aux.
CB̃aux = maxpaux I(Vpaux ;Xpaux|Ypaux),
where indices B̃aux have been omitted for brevity. Auxiliary-input secrecy is
defined to mean that CB̃aux ≤ 2−k for all B̃aux and all k.
Lemma 6.1 If a protocol (A,B) has the capacity-based secrecy property, it
also provides auxiliary-input secrecy.
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Proof Let k, B̃aux, and paux be fixed. We have to show that
I(Vpaux;Xpaux |Ypaux) ≤ 2−k.
For each y, we define B̃y = B̃aux(y). Thus B̃y is a cheater without auxil-
iary input that acts like B̃aux on input y. Furthermore, let py denote the














In the second line, we used that under the condition Y = y, the a priori
distribution of x is py and B̃aux acts precisely like B̃y. ut
Now we derive a lemma on sequential composability.
Lemma 6.2 Assume that several 2-party protocols (A1, B1) . . . , (Am, Bm)
are executed sequentially, where any number of them may be equal. As the
most general case, we assume that the input of each Ai is some function fi(x)
of one secret x. If all protocols have the capacity-based secrecy property, the
joint protocol (A∗, B∗) = ((A1, . . . , Am), (B1, . . . , Bm)) has a capacity of at
most m · 2−k.
Proof Let a probability distribution p of x and an attacker B̃∗ on the joint
protocol be given. Without loss of generality, we can split B̃∗ into separate
attackers (B̃1, . . . , B̃m) on the individual stages A1, . . . , Am, where each B̃i
starts with the views v1, . . . , vi−1 of the previous stages as an input. Now
I(VB̃∗,p;Xp) = I(VB̃1, VB̃2 , . . . , VB̃m;Xp)
= I(VB̃1;Xp) + I(VB̃2;Xp|VB̃1) + ..+ I(VB̃m;Xp|VB̃1, .., VB̃m−1)
≤ m · 2−k,
because the i-th summand is bounded by the auxiliary-input capacity of the
protocol (Ai, Bi). ut
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6.2 Counterparts of Computational Secrecy Defini-
tions
For completeness, we now consider statistical counterparts of the most com-
mon definitions of computational secrecy and show that they are equivalent
to the definitions in Section 3 except for small parameter transformations.
For an overview of such definitions for encryption schemes and computational
relations between them, see [21].
One of these computational definitions is the so-called polynomial secu-
rity from [16]. The adversary has to distinguish between only two possible
secret inputs x0 and x1, among which A chooses the actual secret with prob-
ability 1/2 each. The adversary may even choose x0 and x1 himself, i.e., pick
those that seem easiest to distinguish. Nevertheless, he should not have a
significant advantage over mere guessing. In a statistical setting, the fact
that the two possible secrets may be specific for each adversary is simply
expressed by quantifying over (x0, x1) and B̃ separately.
The choice of x0, x1 corresponds to the choice of a specific probability
distribution p, the uniform distribution on {x0, x1}. The adversary’s best
strategy is to deterministically make the maximum-likelihood guess given
his view v, i.e., guess xi with qxi ≥ 1/2. The probability that this guess is
correct is qxi, and thus we define his advantage over mere guessing as
adv(x0, x1, v) = |qx0 −
1
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be the expected value of adv(x0, x1, v).
Definition 6.3 The protocol is said to have the advantage-based secrecy
property if for every adversary, B̃, every security parameter, k, and every
pair (x0, x1), the average advantage, Adv(x0, x1), is at most 2−k. ut
Theorem 6.4 Consider a two-party protocol, (A,B), as above.
a) If (A,B) has the bias-based secrecy property, it has an average advan-
tage of at most 2−k−1 for all pairs (x0, x1).
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b) If (A,B) has the advantage-based secrecy property, it has a bias of at
most 2−k+2 for all distributions p.
Proof a) We fix B̃, x0, x1, and k. Let p be the uniform distribution on
{x0, x1}. For any view v,




= 2 · adv(x0, x1, v).
Thus Adv(x0, x1) = 12Biasp.
b) By the proof of Part a), we know that the bias is at most 2−k+1 for all
uniform distributions on two values. Now we have to show that it is at most































These probabilities are in the probability space induced by p. However, the
transition probability Pr[v|x] for a secret input x and a view v only depends
on the protocol, i.e., on B̃ and k, and not on p. Hence we can bound the
inner sum for any given pair (x, x′) by using the precondition about the bias
for the uniform definition p′ on these two values in the same rewritten form:
2−k+1 ≥ Biasp′

























This finishes the proof. ut
The second definition of computational secrecy is semantic security, also de-
fined in [16]. Here, an arbitrary efficiently computable function f on the
message space is given, and the adversary tries to guess f(x) significantly
better given his view v than he could have done a priori. For a statistical
counterpart, we simply consider all functions f on the message space. If p
and k are fixed, the best a priori guess is a value y such that the proba-
bility Pr[f−1(y)] of the preimage set of y is maximal. Similarly, the best a
posteriori guess given the view v of the adversary B̃ is a value y such that
Pr[f−1(y)|v] is maximal. Thus we define the semantic advantage for each
view v as










The corresponding definition of statistical semantic secrecy is clear. It is also
clear that advantage-based secrecy is a special case of statistical semantic
secrecy where p is the uniform distribution on two messages and f is the
identity function. Conversely, we prove that bias-based secrecy implies sta-
tistical semantic secrecy. We fix B̃, p, k, and a view v. Let ymax be the best
a posteriori guess. Then




















Averaging over v gives the desired result.
The third well-known definition of computational secrecy is Yao’s in [29].
It can be seen as a computational counterpart of capacity-based secrecy.
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7 Conclusion
We have studied notions of statistical secrecy of a protocol input. By proving
that an information-theoretic definition is essentially equivalent to a defini-
tion based on the L1-norm, which generalizes previous definitions in cryptol-
ogy, we opened ways for more elegant proofs of secrecy, because information
is a measure that allows many types of combinations. We demonstrated this
in the proof of a multi-bit commitment scheme and a proof of the compos-
ability of protocols.
The commitment scheme is of independent interest because it is efficient
and can be built from arbitrary collision-intractable hash functions, which
is both a weak assumption in theory and useful in practice, since very ef-
ficient hash functions exist. An interesting open question is whether the
reverse implication is also true, i.e., whether the existence of efficient multi-
bit commitment schemes implies the existence of collision-intractable hash
functions.
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